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Abstract 
This study examined children’s nuanced understanding of prosocial liars and self-
serving liars across the following three areas: children’s willingness to learn 
information from liars, their judgments of liars through their friend preferences, 
and their visual attention to liars. As children develop theory of mind skills, they 
learn they can manipulate other’s knowledge states by telling lies. They also 
evaluate lying based on whether the liar has self-serving or prosocial intentions, 
with the former judged more negatively and the latter judged more positively. 
Based on research findings indicating that children demonstrate selective trust in 
informants based on their previous accuracy or reliability, the current study aimed 
to discern whether children (ages 4-11 years old) base their willingness to learn 
novel information on their evaluations of deceptive informants with sensitivity to 
the informants’ intentions. Results suggest that as children age and increase in 
moral theory of mind, they increasingly trust information from a prosocial lying 
informant compared to a neutral informant, and appear to trust information from a 
self-serving lying informant marginally less than a neutral informant. Further, 
regardless of intentions of the lying informant, children tend to avoid choosing the 
lying informant as a friend. Some differences in visual attention are also 
discussed. Overall, this research indicates that children may have a more nuanced 
understanding of the intentions of deceptive informants that becomes more 
pronounced with age, yet children still prefer to have friends who do not lie.  
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Introduction 
 As children are learning to navigate their social worlds, they begin to tell 
lies in various situations, such as covering up transgressions or to receive rewards. 
This type of lying is referred to as self-serving lying and involves lying to protect 
oneself often at another person’s expense. Typically, children are instructed by 
parents and other adults that lying is a bad behavior and they should avoid 
engaging in this behavior. Yet, parents encourage children to lie in politeness 
situations, such as when children receive an undesirable gift and are encouraged 
to tell the gift-giver that they indeed do like the gift. This type of lying is referred 
to as prosocial lying. Prosocial lying involves lying to dampen the emotional 
distress or harm that another may feel. Since children are told not to lie, this 
concept of lying for a prosocial reason may be confusing at a young age. 
 Of course, children also interact with people in their everyday 
environments who may lie to them or others. Given this, children need to develop 
the skills to differentiate between people who are reliable and unreliable sources 
of information to determine who they should trust. One possibility is that children 
perceive all people who lie as unreliable sources of information; if this is the case, 
then children should avoid trusting information from individuals who exhibit lie-
telling behaviors. My master’s thesis examined this possibility to determine 
whether and when children develop a differential understanding of different types 
of lying, specifically distinguishing between prosocial lying and self-serving 
lying.  
Development of Theory of Mind 
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 As lying becomes relevant in children’s lives, theory of mind skills play 
an important role. Theory of mind refers to the ability to understand that others 
have a set of beliefs, desires, intentions, and knowledge states that may differ 
from one’s own mental state. These skills begin to develop in early childhood and 
are utilized to explain others’ actions. According to Bartsch and Wellman (1995), 
the development of theory of mind occurs in three phases, as discussed next. 
 Around two years of age, children use desires to explain others’ actions 
and have little to no understanding about beliefs - this is referred to as the desire 
phase. Children at this age can talk about and understand that people do things to 
satisfy their individual desires, but they fail at belief reasoning tasks that three-
year-old children pass with ease (Wellman & Woolley, 1990). For example, 
children can understand that their friend stole a cookie because that is what their 
friend desired, but they have more difficulty understanding that their friend stole a 
cookie because they desired it and believed the action they took would satisfy the 
desire. Around three years of age, children begin to have an understanding of 
beliefs, yet they do not use their knowledge of beliefs to explain the actions of 
others – this transitory phase is called the desire-belief phase. Past research has 
found evidence that three-year-old children have an understanding of beliefs and 
even false beliefs- having an understanding that others can be mistaken about the 
reality of a situation (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991; Moses, 1993; Siegal & Beattie, 
1991). Yet even with this knowledge, children in this phase of development still 
tend to explain others’ actions in terms of desires, even when probed to refer to 
beliefs (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989).  
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 It is not until around four years of age that children begin to use their 
understanding of beliefs and false beliefs to explain actions – referred to as the 
belief-desire phase. Four-year-old children begin to use beliefs more consistently 
to explain actions by attributing mental states, beliefs, and knowledge states to 
other people. Children of this age start to recognize that people engage in actions 
because they believe the actions will help achieve their desires regardless of the 
outcomes of those actions. Once children develop the theory of mind skills to this 
point, they are able to understand that others have a different knowledge set than 
their own and can use this information in a variety of ways, including engaging in 
lie-telling behaviors themselves as well as realizing that others could be lying. For 
example, once a four-year-old child realizes that his mother does not know he 
stole cookies from the cookie jar, he can use his understanding of her knowledge 
state (that she doesn’t know who took the cookies) to engage in a self-serving 
lying behavior (e.g., by telling his mother “it wasn’t me” when questioned). 
 Deception and lie-telling are relevant to moral understanding and 
evaluations, especially as children are able to make inferences about the beliefs of 
others and their intentions. For example, is the act of deceiving others always 
considered a bad behavior? Or do moral evaluations change based on children’s 
understanding of a lie-teller’s intentions? Researchers developed a task, called 
“The Accidental Transgressor” in order to measure children’s morally relevant 
false belief theory of mind (Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 
2011). In this task, children are read a story about a student who unknowingly 
throws out his or her classmate’s cupcake in an attempt to help a teacher clean the 
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classroom, and are asked questions regarding the accidental transgressor’s 
knowledge state and intentions. Results revealed that older children (7.5-year-
olds) judged the intentions of the transgressor more positively than did younger 
children (3.5-year-olds). Further, when asked why, older children were more 
likely to justify their evaluations by mentioning that the transgressor did not have 
negative intent, indicating a more developed understanding of accidents and the 
intentions of others. Children’s ability to understand the intentions of others in a 
morally relevant situation may indeed play a role in their ability to understand the 
intentionality of lie-tellers in prosocial and self-serving situations as well. 
Summary 
Young children tend to understand and explain actions only using desire 
psychology. By three years of age, they begin to understand beliefs and false 
beliefs, yet do not utilize this understanding in their explanations of others’ 
actions. Around four years of age, children begin to systematically attribute 
mental states, beliefs, and knowledge states to others and use this information to 
explain their individual actions. Given this developing understanding of others’ 
mental states, it is of interest to examine the ages at which children begin to 
engage in lying behavior themselves as this involves understanding that others do 
not have knowledge about the actual circumstances of an event. Further, it may be 
important to examine children’s morally relevant theory of mind in relation to 
their understanding of prosocial and self-serving lies.  
Development of Lying in Children 
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As theory of mind skills develop, children not only have the ability to 
understand someone has a different knowledge state than their own, but they also 
learn they can manipulate others’ knowledge states through lying. Children then 
can use these skills in two main ways – telling self-serving lies to manipulate 
someone’s mental state for selfish reasons or telling prosocial lies to do so for the 
emotional benefit of others, demonstrating social and emotional competence. 
Generally, children first begin to tell lies to cover up a transgression or to get a 
reward. Then, children begin to tell anti-social or self-serving lies for either their 
own gain or to avoid punishment (Talwar & Crossman, 2011). Typically, the 
development of lying behaviors is seen as a bad behavior that is worrisome to 
parents and caretakers. 
Research examining children’s development of these negative lying 
behaviors often utilizes a temptation resistance paradigm, in which children are 
asked not to peek at an object when an experimenter steps out of the testing room 
(Evans & Lee, 2013; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Upon return, the experimenter asks 
the children if they peeked at the toy. If the children lie, they are then asked what 
they believe the object to be and why. Results from these studies have indicated 
that children are able to tell lies around the age of three to four years old (Talwar 
& Lee, 2008); one study even suggested that children as young as two to three 
years old have the ability to do so and that this ability to tell lies correlates with 
children’s levels of executive functioning on a Stroop task (Evans & Lee, 2013). 
As children reach five to six years of age, they demonstrate better lying skills, 
such as being able to maintain their lies. For example, when the children who 
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peeked in the above study (Talwar & Lee, 2008) are asked what they think is the 
object, younger children will respond naming the correct object, indicating that 
they in fact did lie about peeking, while children around five or six will maintain 
their lie by saying they don’t know or giving the name of a different object. 
Further, seven- to eight-year-olds demonstrate the ability to tell more 
sophisticated lies (Talwar & Lee, 2008). After being probed for what the object is, 
children are asked why they think that is the object. Although five- and six-year-
olds are able to maintain their lies, when asked why they tend to implicate 
themselves or give short responses for this question. On the other hand, seven- 
and eight-year-old children are able to give more elaborate responses and keep the 
lie going. Thus, as children age, they become more skilled at lying. 
 Most studies have focused on this negative type of lie-telling, but the 
development of lying behaviors actually demonstrates a normative developmental 
milestone, regardless of whether lie-telling behaviors are considered a desirable 
trait (Talwar & Crossman, 2011). Interestingly, the telling of prosocial lies tends 
to begin later in the developmental timeline than anti-social lies (Talwar & 
Crossman, 2011). A study conducted by Talwar, Murphy, and Lee (2007) aimed 
to examine children’s development of prosocial lying behaviors using an 
undesirable gift paradigm, in which either a child or their parent is presented with 
an undesirable gift, such as a bar of soap, and then is asked by an experimenter 
whether they like the gift. In the case of the parent receiving the gift, the child is 
encouraged by the parent to lie on their behalf. Results from this study indicated 
that most children between the ages of three and eleven are willing and able to tell 
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prosocial lies. Moreover, the percentage of children telling these lies increases 
with age, and the older children told more elaborate prosocial lies.  
 In addition to engaging in lie-telling behaviors themselves, children have 
to recognize when others are lying to them. Lee and colleagues (1997) 
investigated the differences and similarities in children’s evaluations of truth- and 
lie-telling situations by altering the intentions of the truth- or lie-teller. Children in 
this study were seven, nine, and eleven years old (n = 120 Chinese children, n = 
108 Canadian children). Children heard four different scenarios that varied in 
whether the protagonist performed a prosocial or antisocial deed and either lied or 
told the truth about it to a teacher. Not surprisingly, children rated confessing to 
an antisocial deed positively, whereas lying about an antisocial deed was rated 
negatively. This result strengthened with age. In contrast, when the protagonist 
lied for a prosocial reason, seven-year-olds rated this negatively, whereas nine- 
and eleven-year-old children’s ratings were either neutral or positive. This 
indicates that as children age, they begin to take intentionality into account when 
judging lie-telling behaviors, which may influence their willingness to learn from 
various lying informants. 
 Research studies have also examined children’s understanding of a 
specific type of prosocial lie, called a “blue lie” (Fu et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2008). 
Blue lies are told to benefit a collective, sometimes at the expense of an 
individual, and thus serve a prosocial purpose. For example, when someone on a 
team sport knows they aren’t very good, they may tell a blue lie by pretending to 
be sick during an important sporting event so that the team has a better chance of 
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winning. Fu and colleagues (2008) investigated children’s evaluations of blue lies 
and the relation of these evaluations to their blue lie-telling behaviors in a two-
part study; the study involved children ages seven, nine, and eleven years old 
from China. The first experiment (N = 294) explored children’s lie-telling 
behaviors when put in a staged situation where they had to choose between lying 
for a collective of their peers (i.e., telling a prosocial blue lie) or telling the truth. 
As children increased in age, they were more likely to lie in the staged situation. 
The children also heard vignettes involving moral dilemmas where a child 
protagonist faced decisions about lying or telling the truth in situations where 
lying was more beneficial to the self or to the collective. Children were then asked 
whether the characters in the vignettes should lie or tell the truth. The researchers 
found as age increased, children were more inclined to lie for the collective 
(prosocial lying) and less inclined to lie for the self, and this was related to their 
own lying behaviors in the staged real-life situation. More specifically, all age 
groups were more likely to lie for the collective than the self, but seven-year-olds 
were close to chance, while nine- and eleven-year-olds were above chance for 
choosing the character to lie for the collective, further indicating that as children 
age they become more willing to engage in lie-telling behaviors if the lie is told 
with a prosocial intention.  
 The second experiment conducted by these authors (N = 291) delved 
further into children’s moral judgments of blue lies. A similar methodology was 
used as Experiment 1 with the exception that the vignettes in this part involved 
the protagonist actually lying or telling the truth in the given scenarios instead of 
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just considering which option to do. Experimenters then asked the children to 
evaluate the lie- or truth-telling in the vignettes on a seven-point scale ranging 
from “very very bad” to “very very good.” Consistent with Experiment 1, the 
findings from Experiment 2 indicated that as age increased, children rated lying 
for the self more negatively than lying for the prosocial purpose.  Seven-year-old 
children evaluated lying for the collective negatively, while nine-year-old children 
evaluated this type of prosocial lying neutrally, and eleven-year-olds evaluated it 
positively, emphasizing a developmental trend that as children age they become 
more accepting of blue lie-telling. Importantly, these older children not only 
evaluated blue lies less negatively than the younger children, but they actually 
evaluated the prosocial blue lies positively, demonstrating a critical change in 
moral understanding.  
Summary 
 As children grow older, they become more concerned with others as 
opposed to themselves in terms of their moral reasoning. Children also become 
more in tune to the intentions behind others’ actions and more accepting of lying 
for prosocial reasons – they sometimes even prefer it. An open question is 
whether children can use their judgments of a person’s intentions when engaging 
in a lie-telling behavior to evaluate whether that individual is a reliable source of 
information.  
Children’s Selective Trust in Informants 
 A growing body of research has examined how children’s trust in the 
testimony of informants is influenced by the previous reliability of the informants 
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(e.g. Corriveau, Pickard, & Harris, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012). For 
example, Krogh-Jespersen and Echols (2012) proposed that children have a 
default trust in adult testimony that aids in learning novel information, but that 
indications of being an unreliable source of information can violate that trust. 
Their study examined two-year-old children’s (N = 160) willingness to learn 
novel labels for familiar and novel objects from a single informant. Results 
indicated that when the object was novel and children had no other information to 
rely upon, they accepted labeling information from an unreliable informant. In 
contrast, when the object was familiar and children had a label for that object, 
they rejected the information provided by an unreliable informant. In both 
conditions, when the informant was a reliable source of information, two-year-old 
children were willing to learn the novel label for both novel and familiar objects. 
Thus, children are attending to the reliability of an informant when determining 
whether to accept novel label information.  
 Krogh-Jespersen and Echols (2012) utilized a single informant 
methodology adapted to the capabilities of younger children to decrease the 
memory demands for their task. Another paradigm for measuring children’s 
willingness to learn novel information is a two-informant task, in which one 
informant is reliable and the other is unreliable. This task is appropriate for older 
children who have greater memory capabilities. Corriveau, Pickard, and Harris 
(2010) utilized this two-informant paradigm to examine four-year-old children’s 
selective trust in information provided by either reliable or unreliable informants. 
Reliability in this study was presented to children as whether the informants 
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provided appropriate labels for a series of familiar objects: one informant always 
provided accurate labels (labeled a stuffed dog with the appropriate label “dog”) 
and one with inaccurate labels (labeled a stuffed dog with a different familiar 
label, for example, “banana”). Following four familiarization trials, children 
participated in four trials of a novel object labeling task, in which each informant 
labeled a novel object with a different novel label (e.g., “This is a roke” vs. “This 
is a cham”). Children were asked to choose which label they believed applied to 
the novel object; thereby endorsing one of the informants. Results indicated that 
four-year-old children endorsed the information provided by the previously 
accurate informant. In a second part of this study, researchers replicated this 
finding with morphological forms of words. For the familiarization trials, one 
informant consistently used correct morphology (e.g., “Here are some shoes”) 
while the other informant consistently used incorrect morphological forms (e.g., 
“Here are some shoe”). The test trials included novel morphological forms (e.g., 
“Yesterday he glang” vs “Yesterday he glung”). Using a two-informant paradigm 
allows researchers to evaluate whether children have a preference for learning 
novel information from a reliable informant in comparison to an unreliable 
informant.  
 A similar study conducted by Birch, Vauthier, and Bloom (2008) further 
demonstrated children’s trust in testimony with a slightly different task and 
extended previous findings beyond word learning to object functions as well. In 
their study, three- to four-year-old children participated in a history phase in 
which two puppets each labeled four common objects. One puppet consistently 
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labeled all of the objects accurately, whereas the other puppet labeled all of the 
objects using a familiar but incorrect word. Next, children participated in a testing 
phase that consisted of a preference condition and a contrast condition. Each 
condition included the presentation of two pairs of novel objects. In the 
preference condition, both puppets applied the same label (e.g. a “ferber”) to two 
different objects. Then, the experimenter asked children to hand them the 
“ferber.”  In the contrast condition, again both puppets applied the same label to 
two different objects, but in this condition the experimenter asked children to 
hand them an item that had a different object label. For example, the puppets each 
labeled different objects as a “koba” and the experimenter asked the child to hand 
them the “modi.” In this condition, if children applied the novel label to the object 
that the accurate puppet endorsed, they should be more willing to hand the 
experimenter the other object (i.e., the object labeled by the inaccurate puppet). 
Consistent with predictions, results indicated that children chose the object 
labeled by the previously accurate puppet in the preference tasks and chose the 
object labeled by the previously inaccurate puppet in the contrast tasks.  
Following the novel object label trials, children participated in a second 
reliability study examining their willingness to learn object functions from 
accurate vs. inaccurate informants. In this study, the familiarization phase 
involved one puppet applying correct object functions to familiar objects (e.g., the 
puppet says the object is for brushing your teeth when referring to a toothbrush), 
and one puppet applying incorrect object functions to the same familiar objects 
(e.g., the puppet says the toothbrush is for cleaning your face). The test trials were 
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similar to that of the first study, such that the two puppets applied the same object 
function to two different novel objects (e.g., they both stated that different novel 
objects are “for cleaning a toaster”). Then, the experimenter asked the child for 
the object that is used for cleaning a toaster. As in the first study, there were also 
contrast trials. The results indicated that children endorsed the accurate puppet’s 
information in the preference condition for object functions but were at chance for 
the contrast condition. Although the effect for object functions was not as strong 
in the contrast condition as it was for object labels, the results from this series of 
studies demonstrate that children’s selective trust in testimony is not exclusive to 
the word learning domain as there are similar patterns when learning about object 
functions. 
 Children may make judgments regarding selective trust based on factors 
other than reliability; in fact, recent research has examined whether young infants 
attend to group membership as a cue regarding which informant is providing the 
most accurate information. Buttelmann et al. (2013) examined 14-month-old 
infants’ selective trust in informants based on in-group or out-group membership, 
with group membership determined by the language each informant spoke. This 
study examined object preference and imitation using the single-informant 
paradigm, which is suited for an infant population. First, participants watched a 
familiarization video featuring the informant telling a short story either in the 
participants’ native language (in-group language condition) or an unfamiliar 
foreign language (out-group language condition). Following this video, infants 
participated in two imitation tasks that involved watching a video of the informant 
15 
 
performing an unusual action on an object (e.g., turning on a touch lamp with 
his/her head). The experimenter then gave the same object to the infant for 60 
seconds and coded whether the infant performed the unusual action on the object 
at any point during the time-frame. The infants also participated in two preference 
trials that involved watching a video of the informant examining two objects and 
demonstrating a preference for one of the objects. The objects were then placed in 
front of the infant to determine which object the child preferred (e.g., which 
object the infant touched first).  The findings indicated that infants in the in-group 
language condition were more likely to imitate the unusual action than those in 
the out-group condition. However, for the preference tasks, infants’ choices did 
not differ from chance. Thus, at 14 months of age, selective learning from in-
group informants was only evident for the imitation tasks.  
 Not only does group membership influence selective trust, but it also has 
been shown to influence children’s social preferences. In a study conducted by 
Kinzler and colleagues (2009), researchers investigated the influence of foreign 
accents, foreign language, and race on five-year-old children’s friendship choices. 
In Experiment 1 of the study, children viewed two faces on a screen and listened 
to voice clips for each of the photographs including American-accented English, 
French, and French-accented English. The experimenter then asked the children to 
select the child with whom they would want to be friends. Findings from 
Experiment 1 indicated that children demonstrated a preference for native 
language over foreign language as well as native accent over foreign accent when 
choosing friends. Experiment 2 utilized this same methodology to investigate 
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whether comprehensibility of the language influences children’s friendship 
preferences. When asked which child they understood, children selected the child 
with the foreign accent over the child with the foreign language. But when asked 
with whom they would rather be friends, there was no significant difference 
between the child speaking in a foreign accent versus the child speaking in a 
foreign language, indicating that comprehensibility of a social partner is not 
necessarily a cue for social group membership. Experiment 3 of this study again 
utilized the same methodology to investigate whether children’s social 
preferences are more so based on race or accent. Findings from this experiment 
indicated that when no audio information was available, children demonstrated a 
preference of the white child over the black child. Most of the children in this 
study were white, so this preference was expected due to previous research 
findings. Interestingly, when the photograph of the white child was paired with a 
foreign accent and the photograph of the black child was paired with a native 
accent, children demonstrated a friend preference for the black child with the 
native accent. Results from this study indicate that children’s social preferences 
are more complex than simply visual information about another child when other 
information is available, such as language or accent.  
Summary 
 Previous research has demonstrated infants’ and children’s selective trust 
in testimony across multiple domains, including novel word learning, object 
functions, and imitation, using a single informant and two-informant paradigms. 
Results from these studies support the proposal that children use information 
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about an informant, including his or her knowledge state and group membership, 
to determine whether that informant is a reliable source of new information or to 
choose friends. Yet, there are a number of open questions regarding the factors 
that children attend to when determining whom to trust when learning novel 
information.  
Research Aims 
This research study aimed to examine whether children make selective 
judgments regarding whether an informant is a reliable source of novel 
information depending on that informant’s intentions when lying. Specifically, 
children’s ability to differentiate between prosocial liars and self-serving liars was 
examined across the following three areas: children’s willingness to learn novel 
information from liars, their friend preferences, and their visual attention to liars. 
This thesis also examined age-related differences as well as theory of mind 
differences in children’s understanding of deceptive informants.  
Statement of Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses proposed developmental differences in selective 
trust across age, with younger children (4-6-year-olds) avoiding learning from 
liars regardless of intentionality, slightly older children (7-9-year-olds) showing a 
period of transition in their understanding of intentionality as it relates to 
deceptive behavior, and older children (10-11-year-olds) showing a preference to 
learn from a prosocial liar and an active avoidance to trust the self-serving liar. 
The hypotheses also proposed differences in friend preferences and visual 
attention across lying conditions. 
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Willingness to learn. Hypothesis I. As age and moral theory of mind 
scores increase, children will be more likely to trust information from the 
prosocial informant compared to the neutral informant. 
 Hypothesis II. As age and moral theory of mind scores increase, children 
will be less likely to trust information from the self-serving informant compared 
to the neutral informant. 
Friend preference task. Hypothesis III. Children will more often choose 
to be friends with the prosocial informant compared to the neutral informant and 
this pattern will become more prominent with age.  
Hypothesis IV. Children will less likely choose to be friends with the self-
serving informant compared to the neutral informant and this pattern will become 
more prominent with age. 
Visual attention. Hypothesis V. Children will attend differentially to 
faces in the prosocial lying condition than in the self-serving lying condition. This 
aspect of the current thesis was exploratory in nature as visual attention 
differences would not be predicted based on previous accounts of children’s 
reliance on informants with varying levels of reliability. One possibility was that 
children will attend to the faces of the prosocial liar and the self-serving liar 
differently when compared to attention to the neutral informant.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants included 130 children (n = 76 boys, n = 54 girls) between the 
ages of 4 and 11 years of age. In order to ensure variability in age, participants 
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were recruited according to membership in one of four age groups: 4-5-year-olds 
(n = 32, age range = 48-71 months, mean age = 60.19 months, n = 18 males), 6-7-
year-olds (n = 32, age range = 72-95 months, mean age = 85.00 months, n = 17 
males), 8-9-year-olds (n = 32, age range = 96-119 months, mean age = 107.38 
months, n = 18 males), and 10-11-year-olds (n = 19, age range = 121-138 months, 
mean age = 127.68 months, n = 12 males). Participants’ parents completed an 
optional demographic form for their child for which 52.31% did not respond to 
ethnicity and 50.77% did not respond to child’s proficient languages, although all 
participants were fluent in English. Of the participants with responses, ethnicities 
were 62.90% Caucasian, 9.68% Hispanic, 9.68% mixed, 8.06% African-
American, 4.84% Asian, and 4.84% other. Further, parents indicated whether 
children were only exposed to the English language or whether the children had 
been exposed to other languages; 73.44% of children were exposed to English 
only and 26.56% were exposed to at least one other language.  
Fifteen participants were excluded from analysis due to having greater 
than 2 missing answers (n = 13) or due to technical problems with the eye-
tracking computer (n = 2), for a total of 115 participants in the final dataset. All 
participants were recruited through the Museum of Science and Industry, Chicago 
and participated in this study in a designated space there.  Participants received a 
small token of appreciation, such as stickers, erasers, or pencils upon completion 
of the study.  
Materials and Procedure 
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 The study used a 2 (Informant: liar, neutral) x 2 (Lying Type: prosocial, 
self-serving) mixed design with informant as a repeated-measures factor and lying 
type as a between subjects factor. Therefore, each participant experienced a liar 
and a neutral informant, with three types of Willingness to Learn trials - novel 
label, action imitation, and novel function – and a Friend Preference task. Some 
participants (n = 54) additionally completed a moral theory of mind task, which 
was added to the study design at a later timepoint.  
Children were seated next to an experimenter in front of a 17.3-inch laptop 
equipped with a Tobii x3-120 mobile eye tracker. The experimenter explained to 
the participant that they would watch a series of videos of her friends. Two 
familiarization videos featuring the lying and the neutral informants were 
presented individually (described below). The order of presentation of the neutral 
and lying informants was pre-set and counterbalanced across participants such 
that half of participants saw the neutral informant first and half saw the lying 
informant first. Following the familiarization videos, the experimenter explained 
to the participant that they were going watch her friends name some items and 
that she would ask the participant a few questions. Children then participated in 
the following three tasks (described below) that were designed to examine their 
willingness to trust the testimony provided by the informants: the novel object 
label task, the action imitation task, and the novel object function task.  
Following these tasks, for the children who did not participate in the 
Moral Theory of Mind task (n = 61), the experimenter then posed the Friend 
Preference task question (described below). For the children who further 
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completed the Moral Theory of Mind task (n = 54), the experimenter posed the 
Friend Preference task question, and then explained to the children that they 
would hear a short story and answer a few more questions. Upon completion of 
the study, the experimenter offered participants a prize from the prize box.  
Familiarization videos. Participants each watched two videos designed to 
introduce them to the two informants appearing in the subsequent tasks: one video 
featured a neutral informant and the other featured an informant who lies. Both 
informants were female. The type of lie being told was a between-subjects factor, 
with children either viewing an informant engaging in a prosocial lie or a self-
serving lie.  
Prosocial lying. The prosocial lying familiarization video introduced 
children to the prosocial intentions that motivated one informant’s lying behavior. 
The video started with a woman looking directly into the camera and saying she 
didn’t like a toy that her friend gave her for her birthday. Then her friend was 
heard approaching off-camera, so the woman turned slightly to address her. The 
friend then asked if the woman liked her birthday gift.  Even though she did not 
like the gift, she told her friend that she liked it anyway (see Appendix A for the 
verbal scripts for the familiarization trials).  
Self-Serving lying. The self-serving lying familiarization video introduced 
children to the self-serving intentions that motivated one informant’s lying 
behavior. The video started with a woman looking directly into the camera and 
saying that she accidentally broke her friend’s toy. Then her friend was heard 
approaching off-camera, so the woman turned slightly to address her. The friend 
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then asked if the woman knew what happened to her broken toy. Even though the 
woman knew she broke the toy herself, she told her friend that the toy was already 
broken when she got there.  
Neutral control. The neutral familiarization video introduced children to 
an informant who was not a liar. The video started with a woman looking directly 
into the camera and saying that she really liked a toy and wondered if her friend 
would like it too. Then her friend was heard approaching off-camera, so the 
woman turned slightly to address her. The friend then asked the woman if the 
item was her toy, to which she replied yes and that she thought it was pretty cool. 
Selective Trust Tasks. After viewing the familiarization videos of one of 
the lying informants and a neutral informant, all participants engaged in three 
types of selective trust tasks: the novel object label task, the action imitation task, 
and the novel object function task. Each task consisted of two trials. Task order 
was pre-set, but the object labels, functions, and actions performed by the 
informants were counterbalanced.  
Novel object label task. This task assessed children’s willingness to learn 
a novel label from the informants across two trials. Each trial began with a video 
of each of the informants (i.e., one neutral and one liar) presenting a different 
novel label for the same novel object (e.g., “That’s a gep” vs. “That’s a dax”). 
Immediately after watching both videos, an image of the novel object appeared on 
the screen and the participant was prompted by the experimenter to endorse one 
of the two novel labels that the informants provided (e.g., “Would you call that a 
gep or a dax?”) The child gave a verbal response. This procedure was repeated 
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with different novel labels (“That’s a blicket” vs. “That’s a dawnu”) for a 
different novel object on the second trial. Each child received a score across the 
two trials, representing the proportion of trials in which the child endorsed the 
novel label provided by the lying informant.  
         Figure 1. Novel object label task example. 
Action imitation task. This task assessed participants’ selective trust in the 
informants’ knowledge about how to perform novel actions. Participants viewed 
two videos – one video of each informant performing an action on the same 
object. In one trial, one informant turned on a toy with her elbow, whereas the 
other informant turned on the same toy with her forehead. In a second trial, each 
informant built the same set of blocks in a different way. Before producing the 
action, each informant stated: “I [use the item] like this” (e.g., “I build the blocks 
like this” or “I turn it on like this”). Immediately after watching both videos, the 
experimenter asked, “Out of those two ways, how would you do it?”  The child 
was then presented with the object and given the opportunity to perform the 
action of their choosing on it. Each child received a score across the two trials, 
representing the proportion of trials in which the child imitated the action 
performed by the lying informant. 
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Figure 2. Action imitation task example. 
 Novel object function task. This task measured children’s selective trust 
in the informants’ knowledge about how novel objects work. This task was 
similar to the novel object label task except instead of labeling objects, the 
informants described how they each use the same object (e.g., “That’s for holding 
pencils” vs. “That’s for working out”). Then an image of the object was presented 
on the screen and the experimenter prompted the participant, “Would you use this 
for working out or holding pencils?” This task also included a second trial in 
which a different object was used along with two different functions (“That’s for 
picking up toys” vs. “That’s for carrying a water bottle”). The child’s verbal 
response was recorded. Similar to the above tasks, each child received a score 
across the two trials, representing the proportion of trials in which the child 
endorsed the function performed by the lying informant. 
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Figure 3. Novel object function task example. 
Friend Preference Task. Following the three selective trust tasks, the 
experimenter prompted the child with one question, which was used to address 
children’s social preferences. This question examined whether children encoded 
the intentionality information related to the liar in comparison to the neutral 
informant. Two images were presented side-by-side to the participant – one of the 
neutral informant and one of the lying informant. The experimenter then posed 
the question: “Who would you rather have as your friend?” Children were 
assigned one point if they pointed to the lying informant. 
Moral Theory of Mind Task. Following the Friend Preference task (for 
children who participated in the study after the decision to add a theory of mind 
task; n = 54) the experimenter read each child a short story adapted from the 
Accidental Transgressor task (Killen et al., 2011), which was as follows:  
“Emma (Ethan) and Sarah (Steven) are classmates. One day, Emma brings 
a cupcake to school and puts it in a paper bag because she wants to eat it after 
school. Then she goes out to play. Sarah comes in to help the teacher with 
cleaning the room and notices the bag left on the table. Sarah throws the bag in 
the trash.” 
The characters in the story were matched to the child’s gender. The story 
was read aloud as the experimenter moved or pointed to paper images of the 
characters and items from the story (see Appendix B). Following the story, 
children were asked five questions for which participants received 1 point for 
each correct answer. Points were summed for each participant such that each 
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participant received a score between 0 and 5, with a score of 5 meaning all 
questions were answered correctly, demonstrating a higher level moral theory of 
mind. The questions along with examples of correct answers were as follows:   
1) What did Sarah, the girl who threw out the bag, think was in the bag? 
(trash, nothing) 
2) What was really in the bag? (a cupcake) 
3) Where will Emma look for her cupcake when she comes back to the 
classroom? (on the table, where she left it) 
4) Where is the cupcake really located? (trash bin) 
5) When Sarah threw out the bag, did she think she was doing something 
that was “all right” or “not all right”? Why? (all right) 
Apparatus 
 All of the familiarization videos, task videos and images, and the friend 
preference question images were displayed on a computer screen equipped with a 
Tobii eye-tracker. Thus, eye-tracking data were collected throughout the study 
using a mobile eye-tracker (Tobii x3-120). The data collected from the Tobii eye-
tracker were analyzed in regards to Hypothesis V, addressing whether children’s 
visual attention differs across conditions. For the purpose of this study, we 
focused on visual attention to the image of the informants displayed side-by-side 
during the Friend Preference task. Areas of Interest (AOIs) were generated for 
each of the informants’ faces to determine whether attention to the informants 
differed by informant type (lying or neutral; see Figure 4 below).  
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Figure 4. Areas of Interest of same size and proportion created for 
informant faces.  
Results 
Willingness to Learn 
 Hypothesis I predicted that as children increase in age, they will be more 
likely to trust information from the prosocial lying informant compared to the 
neutral informant. For this analysis, age was measured in months, and willingness 
to trust the prosocial lying informant was measured in terms of the proportion of 
times a child endorsed the information from the lying informant out of the 6 total 
trials (or the number of trials completed by each participant for instances 
involving missing data for some of the trials). To test this hypothesis, a simple 
linear regression was conducted and found that age in months was a significant 
predictor of willingness to learn from the prosocial lying informant, such that as 
for every increase in one month of age, children’s proportion of willingness to 
learn from the prosocial liar increased by 0.33 percent (meaning about a 3.96 
percent increase per year of age) (F(1,56) = 8.41, p = .005), with an R2 of 0.131 
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(see Figure 5 below). As part of Hypothesis I, I further wanted to examine 
whether an increase in moral theory of mind scores predicted an increase in 
children’s willingness to learn from the prosocial lying informant. Another simple 
linear regression was conducted and found that for every increase in theory of 
mind score, children’s proportion of willingness to learn from the prosocial liar 
increased by 11.75 percent, (F(1,24) = 7.68, p = .01), with an R2 of 0.242. Thus, 
Hypothesis I was supported, in that both age and moral theory of mind were 
significant predictors of willingness to learn from the prosocial lying informant in 
the predicted direction. 
 
Figure 5. Simple linear regression with age in months predicting 
proportion of children willing to learn novel information from the 
prosocial lying informant. 
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Hypothesis II predicted that as children increase in age, they will be less 
likely to trust information from the self-serving lying informant compared to the 
neutral informant. For this analysis, age was measured in months, and willingness 
to trust the lying informant was measured in terms of the proportion of times a 
child endorsed the information from the self-serving lying informant out of the 6 
total trials (or the number of trials completed by each participant for instances 
involving missing data for some of the trials). To test this hypothesis, a simple 
linear regression was conducted and found that age in months was not a 
significant predictor of willingness to learn from the self-serving lying informant, 
such that as for every increase in one month of age, children’s proportion of 
willingness to learn from the liar decreased by 0.06 percent (meaning about a 0.7 
percent decrease per year of age) (F(1,55) = 0.29, p = .59), with an R2 of 0.005 
(see Figure 6 below). This did not support our prediction, but was in the expected 
direction. As part of Hypothesis II, we also wanted to examine whether an 
increase in moral theory of mind scores predicted a decrease in children’s 
willingness to learn from the self-serving lying informant. Another simple linear 
regression was conducted and found that for every increase in theory of mind 
score, children’s proportion of willingness to learn from the self-serving liar 
decreased by 7.36 percent, (F(1,26) = 3.99, p = .056), with an R2 of 0.133, 
indicating marginal significance. Thus, Hypothesis II was not supported with age 
as a predictor of willingness to learn from the self-serving lying informant, but 
was marginally supported for moral theory of mind as a predictor. Importantly, 
both age and moral theory of mind were in the predicted direction – older children 
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were systematically less willing to trust information from the self-serving liar than 
younger children. 
 
Figure 6. Simple linear regression with age in months predicting 
proportion of children willing to learn novel information from the self-
serving lying informant. 
Willingness to Learn by Task Type 
 Simple linear regressions were conducted to determine differences by task 
type for the three willingness to learn tasks – novel object label, action imitation, 
and novel object function – for each lying condition. For the Prosocial Condition, 
analyses show that willingness to learn from the liar in the novel object label task 
was significantly predicted by age and marginally significantly predicted by moral 
theory of mind score. Willingness to learn in the action imitation task was 
significantly predicted by moral theory of mind score, but not age. Finally, 
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willingness to learn in the novel object function task had no significant predictors. 
See Tables 1 and 2 below; see Table 7 in Appendix C for a breakdown by age 
group. 
 Novel Object Label Action Imitation Novel Object Function 
 b SE p b SE p b SE p 
Age 
(months) 
0.0054 0.0019 .0056* 0.0024 0.0020 .2369 0.0015 0.0018 .4152 
R2  0.129   0.025   0.012  
Table 1. Willingness to learn (Prosocial Condition) by task type with age as a 
predictor. 
*Significant at .05 level. 
 
 Novel Object Label Action Imitation Novel Object Function 
 b SE p b SE P B SE p 
Age  
(months) 
0.1248 0.0675 .0766* 0.2209 0.0558 .0006** 0.0172 0.0721 .8140 
R2  0.125   0.395   0.002  
Table 2. Willingness to learn (Prosocial Condition) by task type with moral theory 
of mind as a predictor. 
*Significant at .10 level. 
**Significant at .05 level. 
 
For the Self-Serving Condition, analyses show that willingness to learn 
from the liar in the novel object label task was only marginally significantly 
predicted by moral theory of mind score. No other significant relations were 
found. See Tables 3 and 4 below; see Table 8 in Appendix C for a breakdown by 
age group. 
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 Novel Object Label Action Imitation Novel Object Function 
 b SE p b SE p b SE p 
Age  
(months) 
-0.0020 0.0018 .267 -0.0007 0.0017 .6933 0.0005 0.0019 .783 
R2  0.022   0.003   0.001  
Table 3. Willingness to learn (Self-Serving Condition) by task type with age as a 
predictor. 
 Novel Object Label Action Imitation Novel Object Function 
 b SE p b SE p B SE p 
Age  
(months) 
-0.1101 0.0606 .0809* -0.0376 0.0623 .5510 -0.0705 0.062 .266 
R2  0.129   0.014   0.047  
Table 4. Willingness to learn (Self-Serving Condition) by task type with moral 
theory of mind as a predictor. 
*Significant at .10 level. 
Friend Preference 
 Hypothesis III predicted that children in the prosocial lying condition will 
choose to be friends with the prosocial lying informant at greater than chance 
levels (chance = 0.50). A one-sample t-test was conducted comparing the 
proportion of children choosing the prosocial lying informant as a friend (M = 
0.36) to chance. Although there was a significant difference at the 95% level, 
t(48) = -2.23, p = .031, it was not in the predicted direction. Instead, children were 
actually less likely to choose the prosocial lying informant compared to chance. 
This did not support the hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis IV predicted that children in the self-serving lying condition 
will choose to be friends with the self-serving lying informant at lower than 
chance levels (chance = 0.50). A one-sample t-test was conducted comparing the 
proportion of children choosing the lying informant as a friend (M = 0.38) to 
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chance. The difference was not significant at the 95% level, t(52) = -1.82, p = 
.074, however it was trending in the expected direction. Children were marginally 
less likely to choose the self-serving lying informant compared to chance.  
 Collapsing the results across conditions, children chose to be friends with 
the lying informant at a mean proportion of 0.36. This was significantly different 
from chance at the 95% significance level, t(101) = -2.87, p = .005. This indicates 
that overall, children tended to avoid being friends with a lying informant, 
regardless of the intention behind the lies. 
Friend Preference by Age and Moral Theory of Mind 
 Logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine age as a predictor 
of children’s friend preference of the liar compared to the neutral informant for 
each of the lying conditions. Results of both Wald’s tests indicated that age was 
not a significant predictor of friend preference in the prosocial lying condition, 
χ2(1) = 0.3, p = .58, but was a marginally significant predictor of friend preference 
in the self-serving lying condition, χ 2(1) = 3.4, p = .065 such that older children 
were less likely to prefer being friends with the self-serving lying informant (see 
Table 9 in Appendix C for a breakdown by age group). 
 Logistic regression analyses were also conducted to examine moral theory 
of mind as a predictor of children’s friend preference for each of the lying 
conditions. However, results of both Wald’s tests indicated that moral theory of 
mind was neither significant for the prosocial lying condition, χ2(1) = 1.5, p = .22, 
nor the self-serving lying condition, χ2(1) = 0.21, p = .64. 
Visual Attention 
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 Visual attention to the informants was analyzed in the side-by-side 
comparison of informants in the friend preference task for the purposes of this 
study. Mean proportions of total time spent attending to the lying and neutral 
informants’ faces in relation to total time spent attending to the entire scene were 
compared across lying conditions, but no significant differences were found, 
indicating that both informants were attended to for a similar proportion of time. 
See Table 5 below for proportions of total time spent looking at the lying versus 
neutral informants in each of the lying conditions and the corresponding t-test 
analysis results. 
Informant      Prosocial Condition   Self-Serving Condition      t          df          p 
Lying 0.302 0.330 -1.06 103 .292 
Neutral 0.309 0.319 -0.414 103 .680 
Table 5. Mean proportions of total time spent looking at the lying versus neutral 
informants in the Friend Preference task and corresponding t-tests. 
 
Given that both types of informants were attended to for similar durations 
of time across conditions, we next examined whether there were differences in 
participants’ first gaze to the informants for the Friend Preference task, more 
specifically whether the gaze was directed to the lying informant or the neutral 
informant first. Again, no differences were found between lying conditions, 
although the means were in the predicted direction, with the proportion of 
participants who looked at the liar first in the self-serving condition (M = 0.58) 
being slightly but not significantly larger than the proportion of participants who 
looked at the liar first in the prosocial condition (M = 0.51), t(103) = 0.69, p = 
.492. 
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 Finally, we examined whether first gaze on the Friend Preference task was 
related to children’s Willingness to Learn preferences in order to determine 
whether children’s attention was initially drawn to the liar or neutral informant in 
accordance with which informant they had been willing to learn from. Children 
were organized into three groups according to 1) whether they demonstrated a 
preference for the liar (meaning that they endorsed information from the lying 
informant in more Willingness to Learn trials than the neutral informant; e.g. the 
proportion of trials endorsing information from the lying informant was greater 
than 0.50 for each participant), 2) whether they demonstrated a preference for the 
neutral informant, or 3) whether they demonstrated equal preference (meaning 
children endorsed information from the liar and neutral informant equally in the 
Willingness to Learn trials). See Table 6 for proportion of first gazes to the lying 
informant’s face, proportion of total time spent attending to each of the 
informants’ faces in relation to total time spent attending to the scene for each of 
the three specified groups, and the corresponding ANOVA results. 
Preferred to  
Learn From: 
 
n 
 
1st Gaze to Liar 
Total Fixation 
Lying Informant 
Total Fixation 
 Neutral Informant 
Lying Informant 38 0.42 0.32 0.31 
Neutral Informant 37 0.51 0.31 0.34 
Equal Preference 30 0.73 0.31 0.29 
F (2,102)  3.524 0.019 1.86 
p-value    .033* .981 .161 
Table 6. Proportion of first gaze to the liar, proportion of total fixation duration to 
the lying informant, (collapsed across intentionality conditions) and proportion of 
total fixation duration to the neutral informant by Willingness to Learn preference 
group type. 
*Significant at .05 level. 
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Through further analysis of the first gaze to the liar by group type, we 
found a significant difference from chance that indicated when children had equal 
preference of informants in the Willingness to Learn trials, they tended to attend 
to the lying informant first (mean proportion = 0.73) when deciding which 
informant to choose as a friend, t(29) = 2.841, p = .008. The other two groups 
(those who had a preference for either the lying informant or the neutral 
informant) did not differ from chance in terms of whether their first gaze was 
directed to the lying or neutral informant, t(37) = -0.973, p = .337, and t(36) = 
0.162, p = .872, respectively.  
Discussion 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine whether children have a 
nuanced understanding of lying depending on a lie-teller’s intentions. Specifically 
examining whether, as children age and become more skilled in moral theory of 
mind, they develop a more sophisticated understanding of lie-telling behaviors, 
meaning they can distinguish that a person who engages in prosocial lying 
behavior may still be a good source of information, even though he or she 
provided inaccurate information in the past. Thus, an open question was whether 
children are able to consider the contexts for lie-telling behavior when 
determining whether to trust new information from an informant, when 
determining friend preferences, and whether this is reflected in children’s visual 
attention. 
 Regarding children’s willingness to trust new information from a lying 
informant, evidence supported these hypotheses in the predicted directions – that 
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as children increased in age and moral theory of mind, they were more willing to 
trust new information from a prosocial lying informant and less willing to trust 
new information from a self-serving lying informant compared to a neutral 
informant. This pattern demonstrates that children do judge these two types of lies 
differently and the pattern becomes more prominent in older children. This 
suggests that children do have a nuanced understanding of lying depending on 
whether the liar has prosocial or self-serving intentions. This is consistent with 
previous findings, that older children in this age group become more accepting of 
prosocial lying and less accepting of self-serving lying than their younger 
counterparts. However, the relationship was less strong for the self-serving lying 
condition and was only approaching significance with moral theory of mind as a 
predictor of trust, and no relation with age, inconsistent with other findings. This 
difference in results could be due to differences in methodology. The current 
study utilized a methodology where each child only saw one version of a lying 
scenario, while other research methodologies have involved each child evaluating 
multiple versions of each type of lying scenario and creating a composite score of 
their evaluations (e.g. Fu et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2008; Lee et al., 1997). Further, 
the current study had each child evaluate only one type of lying (prosocial or self-
serving), while other research has had each child make evaluations on multiple 
lying types (e.g. blue lying vs. self-serving; Fu et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2008). 
Having each child evaluate multiple types of lying (prosocial and self-serving) 
may result in more defined differences in children’s evaluations of each of these 
types compared to a decision to choose between each of these types of lying 
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informant and a neutral informant to trust information. On the other hand, it is 
also possible that children are more sensitive to prosocial lies than to the self-
serving lies when deciding from whom to learn. A prosocial liar may have a halo 
effect, in which children view the informant as having generally positive traits, 
including a bias toward being helpful when providing information. It is less clear 
whether children determine that a self-serving liar is generally not helpful or, in 
this case, not knowledgeable.  
 It was also predicted that as children increase in age and moral theory of 
mind skills, they will be more likely to choose the prosocial lying informant as a 
friend and less likely to choose the self-serving lying informant as a friend in 
comparison to a neutral informant. Unexpectedly, this was only partially 
supported in that overall, regardless of lying condition, children tended to avoid 
being friends with any type of liar and preferred the neutral informant as a friend. 
The only age-related finding was that older children were less likely than younger 
children to prefer the liar in the self-serving condition. So interestingly, even 
though children became more trusting of the prosocial lying informant, they still 
generally preferred to have a friend who does not lie. 
 Additionally, there were differences in visual attention to the lying 
informants compared to the neutral informants in the Friend Preference task by 
Willingness to Learn preference group type. More specifically, children who had 
an equal preference for the lying and neutral informants in the Willingness to 
Learn trials tended to attend to the lying informant first. This could indicate that 
when children did not know who to trust in the Willingness to Learn trials, they 
39 
 
visually attended first to the lying informant to look for information when making 
the Friend Preference decision. 
 Thus overall, children do seem to use information regarding previous 
intentionality of an informant to make future decisions on whether to trust novel 
information from that individual, which is in line with research demonstrating that 
children and infants selectively trust informants based on previous information on 
the reliability and accuracy of the informants (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; 
Corriveau, Pickard, & Harris, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012). This 
pattern of results also seems to correspond with research findings on children’s 
use of prosocial lying (Talwar, Murphy, & Lee, 2007) and evaluations of 
prosocial lies (Fu et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2008; Lee et al., 1997), which are rated 
more positively and used more often by older children. But our results indicate 
that this pattern may more so have to do with children’s moral theory of mind 
than their explicit age. This makes sense given that those with higher levels of 
moral theory of mind are better able to understand others’ mental state knowledge 
and thus have the skills to better judge others’ intentions in nuanced situations, 
making moral theory of mind a better predictor of children’s understanding of 
prosocial lying than merely the numerical value of age. 
Limitations of Research & Future Directions  
 One limitation of the study was that the group of 10-11-year-olds had a 
smaller sample size than the other age groups due to adding that older age group 
to the research study at a later timepoint. Perhaps a stronger relationship would 
have been established between age or moral theory of mind and willingness to 
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learn with a larger number of older participants, especially since the pattern in the 
self-serving condition was not as strong as expected given the literature 
demonstrating children’s increasing negative evaluations of self-serving lying as 
children age (Fu et al., 2008; Lee et al., 1997). 
 One potential future direction to help elucidate children’s selective trust in 
informants based on intentionality should involve directly contrasting the two 
types of lying – prosocial and self-serving – instead of separately against a neutral 
informant. This could address the question of whether all lying is an equally bad, 
untrustworthy behavior or if children are more willing to trust a liar who has good 
intentions. Also, since the results of the Friend Preference task did not match our 
predictions, it might be important for future research to include a justification 
question regarding why children chose one informant to be their friend over the 
other in order to get a more in-depth understanding of the children’s choices. 
Finally, since visual attention in this study was exploratory, future studies could 
examine differences in visual attention for other tasks besides the Friend 
Preference task. 
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Appendix A. Familiarization Scripts 
Prosocial Lying: 
Close-up of informant talking to the audience with a toy placed in front of her. 
Informant: “Ugh! I don’t like this toy. My friend, Susan, gave it to me. I don’t 
want her to know I hate it. Oh, here she comes.” 
 
Friend enters room off-screen. Informant turns slightly to face her. 
Informant: “Hi, Susan.” 
Friend (Susan): “Hi. Do you like the birthday gift from me?” 
Informant: “Yes, I do. It’s my favorite toy, so thank you.” 
 
 
 
Self-Serving Lying: 
Close-up of informant talking to the audience with a toy place in front of her. 
Informant: “Oh no! I broke this toy. My friend, Amy, let me borrow it. I don’t 
want her to know I broke it. Oh, here she comes.” 
 
Friend enters room off-screen. Informant turns slightly to face her. 
Informant: “Hi, Amy.” 
Friend (Amy): “Hi. Do you know what happened to my toy?” 
Informant: “No, I don’t. It broke, but it wasn’t me.” 
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Appendix A Cont’d 
Neutral Control: 
Close-up of informant talking to the audience with a toy placed in front of her. 
 
Informant: “Ooh! I like this toy. I just got it as a gift. I wonder if my friend, 
Claire, will like it too. Oh, here she comes.” 
 
Friend enters room off-screen. Informant turns slightly to face her. 
 
Informant: “Hi, Claire.” 
 
Friend (Claire): “Hi. Look at that; is that your toy?” 
 
Informant: “Yes, it’s mine. And I think it’s pretty cool.” 
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Appendix B. Morally Relevant Theory of Mind Images 
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Appendix C. Tasks Across Age Groups 
 
Age n Novel Label Action Imitation Novel Function Overall 
4-5 16 0.34 0.47 0.41 0.39 
6-7 16 0.44 0.56 0.44 0.49 
8-9 16 0.53 0.56 0.53 0.55 
10-11 10 0.75 0.70 0.45 0.63 
Table 7. Willingness to Learn tasks by age group for the Prosocial Condition. 
 
Age n Novel Label Action Imitation Novel Function Overall 
4-5 16 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.48 
6-7 16 0.53 0.43 0.53 0.47 
8-9 16 0.34 0.57 0.47 0.46 
10-11 9 0.39 0.39 0.50 0.43 
Table 8. Willingness to Learn tasks by age group for the Self-Serving Condition. 
 
 Prosocial Self-Serving 
Age n Proportion Liar n Proportion Liar 
4-5 16 0.27 14 0.64 
6-7 16 0.36 14 0.29 
8-9 16 0.43 16 0.31 
10-11 10 0.33 9 0.22 
Table 9. Friend Preference task by age group and lying condition. 
 
 Prosocial Self-Serving 
Age n MoToM n MoToM 
4-5 4 2.75 6 3.17 
6-7 8 4.33 8 4.25 
8-9 8 4.50 8 4.88 
10-11 6 4.83 6 4.83 
Table 10. Moral Theory of Mind task by age group and lying condition. 
